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Abstract. In a seminal contribution, Hansson has demonstrated that the family of de-
cisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter.
If the population under consideration is infinite, his result implies the existence of non-
dictatorial social welfare functions. He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to
quasi-transitivity as the coherence property imposed on a social relation, the set of deci-
sive coalitions is a filter. We examine the structure of decisive coalitions and analogous
concepts with alternative coherence properties, namely, acyclicity and Suzumura consis-
tency, and without assuming that the social relation is complete. Journal of Economic
Literature Classification No.: D71.
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1 Introduction
Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem establishing the existence of a dictator as a consequence of a
set of seemingly innocuous properties of a social welfare function is the most fundamental
result in the theory of social choice. Its conclusion depends crucially on the assumption
that the population under consideration is finite and alternative methods of proof pro-
vided by authors such as Fishburn (1970), Sen (1979) and Suzumura (2000) highlight the
important role played by this finiteness property. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) and
Hansson (1976) consider the structure of decisive coalitions in the Arrovian framework.
A coalition (that is, a subset of the population) is decisive if its members can always guar-
antee a strict social preference for any alternative over any other if all coalition members
have a strict preference for the former. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) and Hansson
(1976) establish that, in the general case where the population may be finite or infinite,
the set of decisive coalitions forms an ultrafilter, given that social relations are assumed
to be orderings and Arrow’s axioms unlimited domain, weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives are satisfied. In the finite-population case, all ultrafilters are
principal ultrafilters, that is, they are generated by a singleton. This singleton, is, by
definition of the decisiveness property, a dictator. Thus, the results of these two papers
generate Arrow’s theorem as a corollary. In contrast, if the population is infinite, there
exist non-principal ultrafilters and these ultrafilters correspond to decisive coalition struc-
tures that are non-dictatorial. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) argue that sets of decisive
coalitions that are non-principal ultrafilters still have a dictatorial flavor when expressed
in a different space (leading to what they refer to as “invisible” dictators) but this does not
make the underlying social welfare functions themselves dictatorial; see Hansson (1976)
for a discussion.
There has been some renewed interest in specific applications of infinite-population
Arrovian social choice, particularly in the context of infinite-horizon social choice prob-
lems where the unidirectional nature of the flow of time permits some natural domain
restrictions; see, for instance, Ferejohn and Page (1978), Packel (1980) and Bossert and
Suzumura (2008b). In this paper, we reexamine Hansson’s (1976) approach from a differ-
ent perspective by relaxing the properties imposed on social preferences. As in the original
Arrovian setting, Hansson assumes in his first set of results that a collective choice rule
always generates orderings. Moreover, he considers the case where social preferences are
merely quasi-transitive but not necessarily transitive while retaining the richness proper-
ties of reflexivity and completeness. In this case, the family of decisive coalitions does not
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necessarily form an ultrafilter but it always is a filter. We will discuss these structures in
more detail once we have introduced the requisite formal definitions.
Our first step towards a comprehensive analysis of the resulting decisiveness struc-
tures when the requirements imposed on social relations are relaxed consists of dropping
reflexivity and completeness and exploring the consequences of transitivity and of quasi-
transitivity by themselves. It turns out that, in the absence of any richness properties, the
decisive coalition structures resulting from Arrow’s axioms are the same for transitivity
and for quasi-transitivity: the family of decisive coalitions is a filter in each of the two
cases. Thus, unlike in the reflexive and complete case, transitivity and quasi-transitivity
can be used interchangeably. Intuitively, this is the case because weak Pareto deals with
strict preferences only and, without reflexivity and completeness, the absence of a strict
preference for one alternative over another does not imply a weak preference in the other
direction. As is the case for Hansson’s results, the implications can be reversed in the
sense that, for any given filter, there exists a collective choice rule that generates transitive
(and thus quasi-transitive) social preferences that have this given filter as the family of
decisive coalitions. A corollary of our observations is that reflexivity and completeness
are redundant in the case of quasi-transitive social preferences: the decisiveness structures
are unchanged if these two richness properties are added.
We then move on to an environment where social preferences are assumed to sat-
isfy alternative weakenings of transitivity, namely, acyclicity or Suzumura consistency.
Acyclicity rules out the existence of strict preference cycles, whereas Suzumura consis-
tency (Suzumura, 1976) eliminates the existence of cycles with at least one strict prefer-
ence. Transitivity implies Suzumura consistency which, in turn, implies acyclicity. Quasi-
transitivity is intermediate in strength between transitivity and acyclicity as well and it
is independent of Suzumura consistency. In the case of a reflexive and complete rela-
tion, transitivity and Suzumura consistency are equivalent. Suzumura consistency is an
interesting property because it is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering
extension (Suzumura, 1976)—that is, a relation can be extended to an ordering respecting
all weak and strict preferences of the underlying relation if and only if the original relation
is Suzumura consistent. This fundamental insight represents a significant strengthening
of the classical extension theorem established by Szpilrajn (1930) who showed that transi-
tivity is sufficient for the existence of such an extension. Moreover, Suzumura consistency
of a relation corresponds precisely to the requirement that an agent with such a relation
is not a ‘money pump’ according to a well-known illustration of ‘incoherent’ preferences
(Raiffa, 1968, p.78). See Bossert (2008) for a brief overview of recent applications of
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Suzumura consistency.
Both acyclicity and Suzumura consistency are too weak to allow for the standard no-
tion of decisive coalitions. The reason for this observation is that they are not sufficient
to establish results analogous to Sen’s (1995) field expansion lemma. Loosely speaking,
the field expansion lemma, variants of which can be established for transitive and for
quasi-transitive social preference relations, states that decisiveness properties of a coali-
tion can be expanded to all pairs of alternatives as soon as decisiveness is established
for a specific pair. Thus, the best one can hope for is a notion of decisiveness that is
alternative-dependent. Moreover, a coalition cannot be decisive in the usual sense in this
environment because its power to enforce a strict preference for an alternative over an-
other may depend on the preferences of the remaining members of society. Thus, a notion
of decisiveness that applies to pairs of coalitions has to be employed. This property re-
lates to the absence of cycles in chains of pairs of coalitions with the above-mentioned
alternative-dependent definition of decisiveness. Because of the above-described depen-
dence on the alternatives to be compared, the results are considerably more complex
than in the transitive (or, equivalently, the quasi-transitive) case. On the other hand,
the results obtained for acyclicity and Suzumura consistency parallel those for the pair
consisting of transitivity and quasi-transitivity in one respect: acyclicity and Suzumura
consistency lead to the same structure of alternative-dependent decisiveness structures,
just as is the case for transitivity and quasi-transitivity.
In order to obtain a notion of decisiveness that is not alternative-dependent (and thus
easier to express), we strengthen independence of irrelevant alternatives to neutrality. This
is not necessary in the case of (quasi-)transitive social preferences due to the applicability
of suitable versions of the field expansion lemma. We show that alternative-independent
versions of the requisite decisiveness properties can be established and characterized in
this case.
In the following section, we introduce our basic definitions. A brief review of Hans-
son’s (1976) results is given in Section 3. Section 4 generalizes these observations by
examining transitive and quasi-transitive social relations without reflexivity and without
completeness. Acyclicity and Suzumura consistency are analyzed in the Arrovian setting
in Section 5, and Section 6 explores the consequences of strengthening independence of
irrelevant alternatives to neutrality. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 Collective choice rules
Suppose there is a (finite or infinite) set of alternatives X containing at least three ele-
ments. We identify the population with the set N , where N could be finite or infinite and
contains at least two individuals. A (binary) relation on X is a subset R of the Cartesian
product X×X. The set of all relations on X is denoted by B. For notational convenience,
we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R whenever possible without creating ambiguities. The
asymmetric part P of a relation R is defined by
xPy ⇔ [xRy and ¬ yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. The symmetric part I of R is defined by
xIy ⇔ [xRy and yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. Analogously, the asymmetric and symmetric parts of a relation R′ are
denoted by P ′ and I ′ etc. If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, P is the strict
preference relation corresponding to R and I is the indifference relation corresponding to
R.
A relation R is reflexive if and only if xRx for all x ∈ X. R is complete if and only if
xRy or yRx
for all x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y. We refer to reflexivity and completeness as richness
conditions for binary relations because they require that certain pairs be in a relation.
R is transitive if and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ xRz
and R is quasi-transitive if and only if P is transitive. R is acyclical if and only if, for all
x, y ∈ X,
there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that
x = x0, xk−1Pxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y
}
⇒ ¬ yPx
and, finally, R is Suzumura consistent if and only if, for all x, y ∈ X,
there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that
x = x0, xk−1Rxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y
}
⇒ ¬ yPx.
Transitivity, quasi-transitivity, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency are referred to as
coherence properties because they demand that if certain pairs are in R, then others must
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be in R as well (as is the case for transitivity and quasi-transitivity), or that certain others
cannot be in R (as is the case for acyclicity and Suzumura consistency).
A reflexive, complete and transitive relation is an ordering. Transitivity, quasi-transitivity
and acyclicity are well-established coherence properties. Suzumura consistency was in-
troduced by Suzumura (1976) who showed that it is equivalent to the existence of an
ordering extension for a relation R, thereby generalizing Szpilrajn’s (1930) fundamental
extension result. A relation R′ is an extension of a relation R if
R ⊆ R′ and P ⊆ P ′. (1)
R′ is an ordering extension of R if and only if (1) is satisfied and R′ is an ordering.
Transitivity implies quasi-transitivity which, in turn, implies acyclicity. Analogously,
transitivity is stronger than Suzumura consistency which is stronger than acyclicity.
Quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency are independent. If a relation is reflexive
and complete, transitivity and Suzumura consistency are equivalent.
We use T , Q, A, C to denote the set of all transitive, quasi-transitive, acyclical,
Suzumura consistent relations on X, respectively. Furthermore, the set of all orderings on
X is denoted byR. A social relation is an element R of B. We assume that each individual
n ∈ N ranks the elements of X by means of an ordering Rn ∈ R with asymmetric part
Pn and symmetric part In. A profile is a vector R = 〈Rn〉n∈N of orderings on X, one for
each member of society. The set of all such profiles is denoted by RN .
A collective choice rule is a mapping W :RN → B, that is, an unlimited domain
assumption is built into the definition of W . The interpretation is that, for a profile
R ∈ RN , W (R) is the social ranking of alternatives in X. We use R = W (R) to denote
the social preference associated with the profile R with the strict preference relation P
and the indifference relation I. If W (RN ) ⊆ T , W is a transitive collective choice rule;
if W (RN) ⊆ Q, W is a quasi-transitive collective choice rule; if W (RN) ⊆ A, W is an
acyclical collective choice rule; if W (RN) ⊆ C, W is a Suzumura consistent collective
choice rule. Finally, if W (RN) ⊆ R, W is a social welfare function.
Arrow (1951; 1963) imposed the axioms of unlimited domain, weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and showed that, in the case of a finite population,
the resulting social welfare functions are dictatorial: there exists an individual such that,
whenever this individual strictly prefers one alternative over another, this strict preference
is reproduced in the social ranking, irrespective of the preferences of other members of
society. As mentioned above, unlimited domain is already imposed by assuming that the
domain of W is given by RN . The remaining two Arrow axioms are defined as follows.
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Weak Pareto. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ RN ,
[xPny for all n ∈ N ] ⇒ xPy.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ RN ,
[xRny ⇔ xR′ny and yRnx⇔ yR′nx] for all n ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ xR′y and yRx⇔ yR′x].
Let x, y ∈ X be distinct. A set of individuals M ⊆ N (also referred to as a coalition)
is decisive for x over y for a collective choice rule W (in short, M is dW (x, y)) if and only
if, for all R ∈ RN ,
[xPmy for all m ∈M ] ⇒ xPy.
Furthermore, a set M ⊆ N is decisive for W if and only if M is dW (x, y) for all distinct
x, y ∈ X. Clearly, N is decisive for any collective choice rule satisfying weak Pareto. If
there is an individual n ∈ N such that {n} is decisive for W , individual n is a dictator
for W . Let DW denote the set of all decisive coalitions for a collective choice rule W .
3 Hansson’s results
Before summarizing Hansson’s (1976) contributions, we require some observations regard-
ing filters and ultrafilters. A filter on N is a collection F of subsets of N such that
f.1. N ∈ F ;
f.2. ∅ 6∈ F ;
f.3. for all M,M ′ ⊆ N , ([M ∈ F and M ⊆M ′] ⇒ M ′ ∈ F);
f.4. for all M,M ′ ∈ F , M ∩M ′ ∈ F .
An ultrafilter on N is a maximal filter U on N in the sense that, within the class of
all filters on N , U is undominated in terms of set inclusion. That is, a filter U on N is
an ultrafilter on N if there does not exist a filter F on N such that U is a strict subset
of F . It is well-known that an equivalent definition of an ultrafilter is the following. An
ultrafilter on N is a collection U of subsets of N such that
u.1. ∅ 6∈ U ;
u.2. for all M,M ′ ⊆ N , ([M ∈ U and M ⊆M ′] ⇒ M ′ ∈ U);
u.3. for all M,M ′ ∈ U , M ∩M ′ ∈ U ;
u.4. for all M ⊆ N , [M ∈ U or N \M ∈ U ].
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Note that the conjunction of properties u.1 and u.4 implies that N ∈ U and, further-
more, the conjunction of properties u.1 and u.3 implies that the disjunction in property
u.4 is exclusive—that is, M and N \M cannot both be in U . Moreover, the conjunction
of u.3 and u.4 implies that
for all M ∈ U and for all M ′ ⊆M, [M ′ ∈ U or M \M ′ ∈ U ]. (2)
To see this, let M ∈ U and M ′ ⊆ M . If M ′ ∈ U , we are done. If not, u.4 implies
N \M ′ = (N \M) ∪ (M \M ′) ∈ U . By u.3, M ∩ [(N \M) ∪ (M \M ′)] = M \M ′ ∈ U
and (2) is established.
To prove the equivalence of the two above definitions of an ultrafilter, suppose first
that U is a collection of subsets of N satisfying u.1 through u.4. Clearly, U is a filter on
N because the conjunction of u.1 through u.4 implies the conjunction of f.1 through f.4.
By way of contradiction, suppose U is not undominated in terms of set inclusion. Then
there exists a filter F on N such that U ⊆ F and F \ U 6= ∅. Let M ∈ F \ U . Because
M 6∈ U , N \M ∈ U by u.4. Because U ⊆ F , N \M ∈ F . By u.3, M ∩ (N \M) = ∅ ∈ F ,
contradicting f.2.
Now let U be a maximal filter on N and, by way of contradiction, suppose that U does
not satisfy u.1 through u.4. u.1 through u.3 are satisfied because they are equivalent to
f.2 through f.4 and U is assumed to be a filter on N . Thus, u.4 must be violated and
there exists M ⊆ N such that M 6∈ U and N \M 6∈ U . Because U is a filter, neither M
nor N \M can be empty (and, thus, neither M nor N \M can be equal to N), neither M
nor N \M can be a strict superset of an element of U and neitherM nor N \M can be the
intersection of two elements in U . Define F = U ∪ {M}. Then F is a filter because the
addition of M to U does not require any other additions to U as we have just established.
But because M 6∈ U by assumption, this means that U is not maximal, a contradiction.
An ultrafilter U is principal if there exists an n ∈ N such that, for all M ⊆ N , M ∈ U
if and only if n ∈ M . Otherwise, U is a free ultrafilter. If N is a finite set, then all
ultrafilters are principal: starting with the finite set N which is an element of U , we can
apply (2) repeatedly until we reach an n ∈ N such that {n} ∈ U . By u.2, this immediately
implies that U is principal. If N is infinite, however, there also exist free ultrafilters but
they cannot be defined explicitly; the proof of their existence relies on non-constructive
methods such as the axiom of choice.
Hansson (1976) has shown that if a social welfare function W satisfies unlimited do-
main, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then DW must be an
ultrafilter on N . Conversely, if U is an ultrafilter on N , then there exists a social welfare
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function W satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives such that
DW = U .
Using the above observations on principal ultrafilters on finite sets, we can use Hans-
son’s results to obtain Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem for the special case of a finite popu-
lation: if the set of decisive coalitions contains a singleton {n}, this singleton is a dictator.
Because the set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter and all ultrafilters are principal if N
is finite, there exists an individual n who is a dictator.
In the infinite-population case, a set of decisive coalitions that is a principal ultrafilter
corresponds to a dictatorship just as in the finite case. However, because not all ultra-
filters are principal in this case, Arrow’s axioms allow for non-dictatorial social welfare
functions—namely, those whose sets of decisive coalitions correspond to free ultrafilters.
Hansson (1976) also considered the case where the social relation is merely required to
be quasi-transitive rather than transitive (but retaining the reflexivity and completeness
assumptions). In that case, the set of decisive coalitionsDW is not necessarily an ultrafilter
but it still is a filter whenever W satisfies weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. In analogy to the corresponding observation for ultrafilters, for any filter F ,
there exists a collective choice rule W that yields reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive
social relations and satisfies weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives such
that DW = F .
4 Hansson’s theorems without richness properties
As a first step in our analysis of the structure of decisive coalitions in the absence of
the richness properties of reflexivity and completeness, we reexamine Hansson’s (1976)
observations involving transitive and quasi-transitive social relations satisfying the Arrow
axioms. Although the resulting decisiveness structures can be recovered following steps
analogous to those employed by Hansson himself, there is an interesting difference: once
reflexivity and completeness are dropped, the families of decisive coalitions associated
with transitive collective choice rules and with quasi-transitive collective choice rules can
no longer be distinguished. Intuitively, this is the case because only strict preferences
are necessarily imposed by weak Pareto and, in the absence of completeness, an absence
of strict preference does not imply a weak preference in the reverse direction. Moreover,
as a corollary to the results of this section, it will become clear that quasi-transitivity
with reflexivity and completeness is equivalent to quasi-transitivity without reflexivity
and completeness, whereas transitivity without reflexivity and completeness results in
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weaker structural properties of the family of decisive coalitions—namely, the same struc-
ture that obtains for quasi-transitivity. It is worth noting at this stage that the notion of
a decisive coalition continues to be well-defined; this is in contrast with the structures to
be uncovered in the following section where we consider alternative coherence properties.
Our first two results strengthen Hansson’s (1976) observations regarding reflexive,
complete and quasi-transitive collective choice rules. We show that reflexivity and com-
pleteness can be dispensed with and yet the family of decisive coalitions is well-defined
and forms a filter in the presence of weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives. As a preliminary result, we show that the conclusion of Sen’s field expansion lemma
(Sen, 1995, p.4) remains valid without reflexivity and completeness.
Lemma 1 Let W be a quasi-transitive collective choice rule that satisfies weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let x, y ∈ X be distinct and let M ⊆ N . If
M is dW (x, y), then M ∈ DW .
Proof. Let W be a quasi-transitive collective choice rule that satisfies the two Arrow
axioms, let x, y ∈ X be distinct and let M ⊆ N be dW (x, y). We have to establish that
M is dW (z, w) for any choice of distinct alternatives z and w. Thus, we have to show that
M is:
(i) dW (z, w) for all distinct z, w ∈ X \ {x, y};
(ii) dW (x, z) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y};
(iii) dW (z, y) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y};
(iv) dW (z, x) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y};
(v) dW (y, z) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y};
(vi) dW (y, x).
(i) Because W has an unlimited domain, we can consider a profile R ∈ RN such that
zPmxPmyPmw for all m ∈M,
zPmx and yPmw for all m ∈ N \M.
By weak Pareto, zPx and yPw. Because M is dW (x, y), we have xPy. By quasi-
transitivity, zPw. Because of independence of irrelevant alternatives, this social pref-
erence cannot depend on individual preferences over pairs of alternatives other than z
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and w. The ranking of z and w is not specified for individuals outside of M and, thus,
M is dW (z, w).
(ii) Consider a profile R ∈ RN such that
xPmyPmz for all m ∈M,
yPmz for all m ∈ N \M.
Because M is dW (x, y), we have xPy. By weak Pareto, yPz. By quasi-transitivity, xPz
and it follows as in the proof of (i) that M is dW (x, z).
(iii) Let R ∈ RN be such that
zPmxPmy for all m ∈M,
zPmx for all m ∈ N \M.
By weak Pareto, zPx. Because M is dW (x, y), we have xPy. By quasi-transitivity, zPy
and it follows as in the proof of (i) and (ii) that M is dW (z, y).
(iv) Let R ∈ RN be such that
zPmyPmx for all m ∈M,
yPmx for all m ∈ N \M.
By (iii), zPy. Weak Pareto implies yPx and, by quasi-transitivity, we obtain zPx. As in
the earlier cases, it follows that M is dW (z, x).
(v) Let R ∈ RN be such that
yPmxPmz for all m ∈M,
yPmx for all m ∈ N \M.
By weak Pareto, yPx. By (ii), we have xPz. By quasi-transitivity, yPz and it follows
that M is dW (y, z).
(vi) Let R ∈ RN be such that
yPmzPmx for all m ∈M.
By (v), yPz and by (iv), zPx. By quasi-transitivity, yPx and it follows thatM is dW (y, x).
Hansson’s (1976) theorem remains valid even in the absence of reflexivity and complete-
ness. Thus, we obtain the following result.
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Theorem 1 If a quasi-transitive collective choice rule W satisfies weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, then DW is a filter on N .
Proof. Suppose W is a quasi-transitive collective choice rule that satisfies weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We need to show that DW has the four
properties of a filter.
f.1. This property is an immediate consequence of weak Pareto.
f.2. If ∅ ∈ DW , we obtain xPy and yPx for any two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X and
for any profile R ∈ RN such that all individuals are indifferent between x and y, which
is impossible. Thus, ∅ 6∈ DW .
f.3. This property follows immediately from the definition of decisiveness.
f.4. Suppose M,M ′ ∈ DW . Let x, y, z ∈ X be pairwise distinct and let R ∈ RN be such
that
yPmx and zPmx for all m ∈ M \M ′,
zPmxPmy for all m ∈ M ∩M ′,
xPmy and xPmz for all m ∈ M ′ \M.
Because M is decisive, we have zPx. Because M ′ is decisive, we have xPy. By quasi-
transitivity, zPy. This implies that M ∩M ′ is dW (z, y) because the preferences of indi-
viduals outside of M ∩M ′ over z and y are not specified. By Lemma 1, M ∩M ′ ∈ DW .
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, it follows that if W is a transitive rather than
a quasi-transitive collective choice rule, the same conclusion holds: the family of decisive
coalitions must form a filter in the presence of the two Arrow axioms.
We now examine the possibility of establishing the reverse implication of that in Theo-
rem 1 in order to see whether the filter structure exhausts all implications of the requisite
axioms. This is indeed the case, and an even stronger result is valid: given any filter F on
N , it follows that there exists a transitive (and not merely a quasi-transitive) collective
choice rule W satisfying the axioms such that DW = F .
Theorem 2 For any filter F on N , there exists a transitive collective choice rule W
satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives such that DW = F .
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Proof. Let F be a filter on N . Define a collective choice rule W by letting, for all
R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ {m ∈ N | xPmy} ∈ F .
We first prove that R is transitive for all possible profiles R. Suppose R ∈ RN and
x, y, z ∈ X are such that xRy and yRz. By definition of W ,
{m ∈ N | xPmy} ∈ F and {m ∈ N | yPmz} ∈ F .
By f.4,
{m ∈ N | xPmy} ∩ {m ∈ N | yPmz} ∈ F .
Because individual preferences are transitive, it follows that
{m ∈ N | xPmy} ∩ {m ∈ N | yPmz} ⊆ {m ∈ N | xPmz}
and, by f.3, {m ∈ N | xPmz} ∈ F . Thus, by definition of W , xRz as was to be
established.
That weak Pareto is satisfied follows immediately from f.1 and f.2. Independence of
irrelevant alternatives is satisfied because the social ranking of any two alternatives x and
y is defined exclusively in terms of the individual rankings of x and y.
It remains to show that DW = F . As a first step, we show that R is asymmetric for
all possible profiles. By way of contradiction, suppose R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X are such
that xRy and yRx. By definition of W , this means that
{m ∈ N | xPmy} ∈ F and {m ∈ N | yPmx} ∈ F .
By f.3,
{m ∈ N | xPmy} ∩ {m ∈ N | yPmx} = ∅ ∈ F ,
contradicting f.2.
To prove that DW ⊆ F , suppose that M ∈ DW . Let R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X be such
that xPmy for all m ∈ M . By definition of a decisive coalition, this implies xPy and,
thus, xRy. By definition of W , this implies M ∈ F .
To complete the proof, suppose that M ∈ F . Let R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X be such that
xPmy for all m ∈ M . By definition of W , we obtain xRy. Because R is asymmetric, it
follows that xPy. Thus, M is decisive and hence M ∈ DW .
Combining Theorems 1 and 2, it follows immediately that the class of transitive col-
lective choice rules and the class of quasi-transitive collective choice rules have identical
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characterizations in terms of decisive coalitions. This contrasts with the case of collective
choice rules that always generate reflexive and complete social relations where the two
concepts are distinct.
5 Acyclicity and Suzumura consistency
If, in the absence of reflexivity and completeness, merely one of the properties acyclicity
or Suzumura consistency is imposed on social preferences, the approach involving decisive
coalitions and filters employed in the previous section must be amended. This is the case
because the existence of such coalitions is not guaranteed and there is no equivalent of the
field expansion lemma (Lemma 1) with acyclicity or with Suzumura consistency. Intu-
itively, this difference emerges because, unlike transitivity and quasi-transitivity, acyclicity
and Suzumura consistency do not force certain additional pairs to be in a relation as a
consequence of the presence of others but, rather, prevent certain pairs of alternatives to
appear in the relation in order to avoid the respective cycles to be excluded. For that
reason, property f.4 of a filter cannot be established because it relies on the transitivity
of R or P . Moreover, even property f.3 must be abandoned. To see that this is the case,
consider the following example which extends an example due to Bossert and Suzumura
(2008a, p.316). Suppose X = {x, y, z} and N = {1, . . . , 7}. Define a collective choice rule
by letting, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ (|{n ∈ N | yPnx}| = 0 or [|{n ∈ N | xPny}| = 5 and |{n ∈ N | yPnx}| = 2]).
It can be verified that this collective choice rule is Suzumura consistent and satisfies weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, even though xPmy for all
m ∈ {1, . . . , 5} and yPmx for all m ∈ {6, 7} implies xPy, we obtain non-comparability of
x and y rather than a strict preference for x over y if xPmy for all m ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and
yP7x. Thus, an expansion of a coalition that can force x to be preferred to y does not
generate a coalition with that power. In addition, even the coalition {1, . . . , 5} cannot be
considered decisive according to our earlier definition: if xPmy for all m ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, xI6y
and yP7x, non-comparability results again and the coalition {1, . . . , 5} is not decisive.
Thus, the framework based on decisiveness and filters as families of decisive coalitions
cannot be employed. In this context, it is interesting to compare our results to those of
Banks (1995). Banks employs a monotonicity property that strengthens independence
of irrelevant alternatives. This property is akin to non-negative responsiveness, requiring
that a strict preference for x over y must be preserved if we move to a profile where the
13
set of those preferring x to y and the set of those considering x at least as good as y
weakly expand. Clearly, this property rules out examples of the above nature. See also
Blair and Pollak (1982) for discussions of acyclical collective choice in the presence of the
richness properties reflexivity and completeness. As is the case for Banks (1995), Blair
and Pollak (1982) restrict attention to the finite-population case.
We now introduce a notion of decisiveness that is not a property of a coalitionM but a
property of a pair of coalitions (M,M ′) with the interpretation thatM is decisive against
M ′ if the social preference strictly prefers x to y whenever all members of M strictly
prefer x to y and all members of M ′ strictly prefer y to x. In addition, because no result
analogous to the field expansion lemma is valid, these pairs of coalitions may depend on
the alternatives x and y to be compared. Note that such a dependence is ruled out in
the transitive and quasi-transitive cases. However, if the social relation merely has to
satisfy Suzumura consistency or acyclicity, it is straightforward to define examples that
illustrate the dependence of the notion of decisiveness of one coalition against another
on the alternatives under consideration. For example, suppose x0, y0 ∈ X are distinct
alternatives, and define a collective choice rule as follows. For all R ∈ RN and for all
x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ ([xRny for all n ∈ N ] or [there exist `,m ∈ N such that
xP`y and yPmx and (x, y) = (x0, y0)]).
This collective choice rule generates Suzumura consistent (and, therefore, acyclical) so-
cial preferences and satisfies weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Furthermore, any coalition M consisting of at least one member can guarantee a strict
social preference of x0 over y0 by expressing a strict preference for x0 over y0 against any
other non-empty coalition M ′ the members of which all strictly prefer y0 to x0. But that
coalition M cannot force a strict social preference of y0 over x0 against M ′. See Bossert
and Suzumura (2008a, p.319) for a discussion of this example in a related but different
context.
Let W be a collective choice rule, let M,M ′ ⊆ N be non-empty and let x, y ∈ X
be distinct. We say that M is decisive against M ′ for W for x over y (in symbols,
(M,M ′) ∈ OW (x, y)) if and only if, for all R ∈ RN ,
[xPmy for all m ∈M and yPmx for all m ∈M ′] ⇒ xPy.
Clearly, (M,M ′) ∈ OW (x, y) implies that M ∩M ′ = ∅ but it is not necessarily the case
that M ∪M ′ = N .
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For x, y ∈ X, let G(x, y) be a family of pairs of subsets of N . An alternative-dependent
cycle-free collection on N is a collection 〈G(x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X such that
g.1. (N, ∅) ∈ G(x, y) for all x, y ∈ X;
g.2. (∅, N) 6∈ G(x, y) for all x, y ∈ X;
g.3. for all K ∈ N, for all non-empty M0, . . . ,MK ⊆ N and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X,
[(Mk−1,Mk) ∈ G(xk−1, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}] ⇒ (MK ,M0) 6∈ G(xK , x0).
The set of acyclical or Suzumura consistent collective choice rules can be identified
in terms of an alternative-dependent cycle-free collection of pairs of coalitions. First, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 3 If an acyclical collective choice rule W satisfies weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, then 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X is an alternative-dependent
cycle-free collection on N .
Proof. Suppose W is an acyclical collective choice rule that satisfies weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. That the collection 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X does not
depend on any profile under consideration is an immediate consequence of independence
of irrelevant alternatives. We need to prove that 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X is an alternative-
dependent cycle-free collection.
The properties g.1 and g.2 follow from weak Pareto. To establish g.3, suppose, by
way of contradiction, that there exist K ∈ N, non-empty sets M0, . . . ,MK ⊆ N and
alternatives x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that
[(Mk−1,Mk) ∈ OW (xk−1, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}] and (MK ,M0) ∈ OW (xK , x0).
(3)
Define a profile R ∈ RN as follows. For all k ∈ {0, . . . , K}, for all m ∈ Mk, for all
` ∈ {0, . . . , K} such that m ∈Mk ∩M ` and for all x, y ∈ X \
⋃
j∈{0,...,K}:
m∈Mk∩Mj
{xj},
x`ImxkPmxImy.
Furthermore, for all m ∈ N \
⋃
k∈{0,...,K} Mk and for all x, y ∈ X,
xImy.
Clearly, R ∈ RN . By definition, Mk−1∩Mk = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} andMK∩M0 = ∅.
Thus, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
[xk−1Pmxk for all m ∈Mk−1] and [xkPmxk−1 for all m ∈ Mk]
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and
[xKPmx0 for all m ∈MK ] and [x0PmxK for all m ∈M0].
By (3) and by definition of 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X , it follows that
xk−1Pxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xKPx0,
contradicting the acyclicity of R.
We conclude this section by showing that Theorem 3 is ‘tight’ in the sense that the
conjunction of properties g.1, g.2 and g.3 is all that can be deduced from the assumptions
in the theorem statement. Moreover, as is the case for transitive and quasi-transitive
collective choice rules, Suzumura consistency and acyclicity cannot be distinguished in
this framework.
Theorem 4 For any alternative-dependent cycle-free collection 〈G(x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X on N ,
there exists a Suzumura consistent collective choice rule W satisfying weak Pareto and in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives such that 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X = 〈G(x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X .
Proof. Let 〈G(x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X be an alternative-dependent cycle-free collection on N .
Define a collective choice rule W by letting, for all R ∈ RN and for all x, y ∈ X,
xRy ⇔ ({m ∈ N | xPmy}, {m ∈ N | yPmx}) ∈ G(x, y).
We now prove that R is Suzumura consistent for all possible profiles R. Suppose this
is not the case. Then there exist R ∈ RN , K ∈ N and alternatives x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such
that xk−1Rxk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xKPx0. By definition of W ,
({m ∈ N | xk−1Pmxk}, {m ∈ N | xkPmxk−1}) ∈ G(xk−1, xk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and
({m ∈ N | xKPmx0}, {m ∈ N | x0PmxK}) ∈ G(xK , x0).
This contradicts g.3.
That weak Pareto is satisfied follows immediately from g.1 and g.2. Independence of
irrelevant alternatives is satisfied because the social ranking of any two alternatives x and
y is defined exclusively in terms of the individual rankings of x and y.
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It remains to show that 〈OW (x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X = 〈G(x, y)〉(x,y)∈X×X . As a first step, we
show that R is asymmetric for all possible profiles. By way of contradiction, suppose
R ∈ RN and x, y ∈ X are such that xRy and yRx. By definition of W , this means that
({m ∈ N | xPmy}, {m ∈ N | yPmx}) ∈ G(x, y)
and
({m ∈ N | yPmx}, {m ∈ N | xPmy}) ∈ G(y, x).
Setting K = 1, M0 = {m ∈ N | xPmy}, M1 = {m ∈ N | yPmx}, x0 = x and x1 = y
yields a contradiction to g.3.
To prove that OW (x, y) ⊆ G(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ X ×X, suppose that (x, y) ∈ X ×X
and (M,M ′) ∈ OW (x, y). Let R ∈ RN be such that xPmy for all m ∈ M and yPmx for
all m ∈M ′. By definition of OW (x, y), this implies xPy and, thus, xRy. By definition of
W , this implies (M,M ′) ∈ G(x, y).
To complete the proof, suppose that (M,M ′) ∈ G(x, y). Let R ∈ RN be such that
xPmy for all m ∈ M and yPmx for all m ∈ M ′. By definition of W , we obtain xRy.
Because R is asymmetric, it follows that xPy. Thus, M is decisive against M ′ for W for
x over y and hence (M,M ′) ∈ OW (x, y).
6 Neutrality
The structure described in the results of the previous section is relatively complex because
of the dependence of the relevant pairs of coalitions on the alternatives under considera-
tion. To obtain a clearer picture, one possibility is to strengthen independence of irrelevant
alternatives to neutrality.
Neutrality. For all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ RN ,
[xRny ⇔ x′R′ny′ and yRnx⇔ y′R′nx′] for all n ∈ N ⇒ [xRy ⇔ x′R′y′ and yRx⇔ y′R′x′].
Let W be a collective choice rule and let M,M ′ ⊆ N be non-empty. We say that M
is decisive against M ′ for W (in symbols, (M,M ′) ∈ SW ) if and only if, for all R ∈ RN
and for all x, y ∈ X,
[xPmy for all m ∈M and yPmx for all m ∈M ′] ⇒ xPy.
Let H be a family of pairs of subsets of N . H is a cycle-free collection if it satisfies
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h.1. (N, ∅) ∈ H;
h.2. (∅, N) 6∈ H;
h.3. for all K ∈ N and for all non-empty M0, . . . ,MK ⊆ N ,
[(Mk−1,Mk) ∈ H for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}] ⇒ (MK ,M0) 6∈ H.
Replacing independence of irrelevant alternatives with neutrality, we obtain the follow-
ing results. They show that a cycle-free structure regarding the relevant pairs obtains but,
unlike in the previous section, this structure is no longer dependent on the alternatives
under consideration. This can be seen easily by noting that neutrality (which strengthens
independence of irrelevant alternatives) implies that any pair (M,M ′) such that M is
decisive against M ′ for W cannot depend on the alternatives to be compared. The rest
of the proofs of the following two theorems then follows as in the previous section.
Theorem 5 If an acyclical collective choice rule W satisfies weak Pareto and neutrality,
then SW is a cycle-free collection on N .
Theorem 6 For any cycle-free collection H on N , there exists a Suzumura consistent
collective choice rule W satisfying weak Pareto and neutrality such that SW = H.
7 Concluding remarks
A question that might arise in relation to the issues addressed in this paper is whether the
concepts developed here could usefully be applied to single-profile social choice problems.
We think this poses some conceptual difficulties which is why we do not pursue this
matter in detail. Samuelson (1977) heavily criticized an assumption that is central to
the Arrow-type impossibilities established by authors such as Kemp and Ng (1976) and
Parks (1976)—namely, the axiom that combines independence with a notion of neutrality.
Our concern regarding the single-profile approach in the context analyzed in this paper
is the following. In addition to an axiom playing the role of multi-profile independence,
the single-profile approach must rely on some form of preference-diversity assumption in
order to construct the preferences over triples of alternatives required. These assumptions
(for example, the axiom of unrestricted domain over triples employed by Pollak, 1979)
tend to impose rather stringent restrictions on the number of alternatives relative to the
number of agents; in particular, the set of alternatives must be rather large. The infinite-
population case is of crucial importance in our setting and an analysis of single-profile
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analogues of our concepts would require to restrict attention to infinite sets of alternatives.
When combined with Samuelson’s (1977) criticism, it seems to us that there is little to
be gained from embarking upon an investigation of that nature.
To the best of our knowledge, the notions of decisiveness developed in the previous two
sections have not appeared in the earlier literature. Especially the alternative-dependent
variant may be worthwhile to be explored further. For instance, it might be possible
to link it to established mathematical structures just as those of filters and ultrafilters
that emerge naturally in the transitive and quasi-transitive cases. Moreover, further
properties of such families of sets could be studied. Some steps in this spirit have already
been taken; see, for instance, Cato (2008) for alternative definitions of decisiveness and
their properties.
The results of this paper are established in a general framework in the sense that
(with the exception of those reported in the previous section) they do not go beyond
the original Arrovian setting—that is, we restrict attention to the axioms employed in
Arrow’s impossibility theorem. There have been approaches that examine to what extent
weakenings of the requirements imposed on social relations allow us to obtain collective
choice rules that may have additional properties such as anonymity or compliance with the
strong rather than merely the weak Pareto principle; see, in particular, Sen (1969; 1970),
Weymark (1984), Bossert and Suzumura (2008a) and Cato and Hirata (2009). Especially
in the acyclical and Suzumura consistent cases, there appears to be room for explorations
in a setting involving additional properties and their consequences.
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